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INTRODUCTION
Universal jurisdiction is an important yet contentious jurisdictional principle
in international law, despite more than 100 states worldwide having universal
jurisdiction legislation (Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: A Prelimi-
nary Survey of Legislation Around the World (2012) 1–2). The principle has
dominated discussions at both the international and African regional levels,
with many voicing practical, political and policy concerns with regard to its
application.
At the African regional level, the African Union (‘AU’) has addressed the
principle in some of its resolutions. On the one hand, the AU has recognised
universal jurisdiction as an international law principle that seeks ‘to ensure
that individuals who commit grave offences such as war crimes and crimes
against humanity do not do so with impunity and are brought to justice,
which is in line with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African
Union [of 2002]’ (see African Union Decision on the Report of the Commission
on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 30 June–1 July 2008,
Assembly/AU/14(XI) para 3). Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act provides
for the AU’s right ‘to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of
the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide
and crimes against humanity’. This is listed as one of the key principles of the
AU. On the other hand, the AU has raised concerns regarding the content,
application and use of the concept. This relates particularly, as the AU avers,
to its use by European States to indict African leaders. The AU believes that
this has the effect of destabilising or impeding the political and socio-
economic progress of African States and is a breach of their territorial
integrity and sovereignty (Assembly/AU/14(XI) op cit para 5). Conse-
quently, the AU has resolved that it will not execute warrants of arrests issued
on the basis of the abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction (see African
Union Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 15–16 July
2012 Doc EX.CL/731(XXI) para 6; see also Assembly/AU/14(XI) op cit
para 5). It should however be noted that ‘[s]elective enforcement . . . [is] a
problem in relation to international crimes, whatever the principle of
jurisdiction invoked’ (Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson &
Elizabeth Wilmshurst An Introduction to International Criminal Law and
Procedure 2 ed (2010) 62). Selective enforcement is therefore not unique to
the exercise of universal jurisdiction.
At the South African level, the application of universal jurisdiction came
to the forefront in a high court case which stemmed from the government’s
failure to investigate acts of torture as crimes against humanity committed by
Zimbabwean officials (Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National
Director of Public Prosecutions & others 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 (GNP), hereafter
‘the SALC case’). The government had shown an unwillingness to institute
an investigation into these acts. Hence, the court had to review the
government’s decision in this regard (para 1). This case reflects, through
the lens of the court, South Africa’s perspective on the exercise of universal
jurisdiction, particularly in relation to the investigation of international
crimes.
South Africa’s perspective on the exercise of universal jurisdiction can also
be seen through the Implementation of the Rome Statute Act 27 of 2002
(‘the ICC Act’). This Act was at the core of the SALC case and will be
discussed later in this note. Another piece of legislation that is a source on
South Africa’s perspective on universal jurisdiction is the Implementation of
the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 (‘the Geneva Conventions Act’ or
‘the GCA’). The Act permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols of 1977. These
treaties apply in situations of armed conflict. The GCA was passed into law
after the SALC judgment. Of relevance also is that on 29 July 2013 the South
African Government formally promulgated the Prevention and Combating
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of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 (‘the Torture Act’), with provisions
that permit the exercise of universal jurisdiction over acts of torture. I will
highlight below, albeit briefly, some relevant provisions in the GCA and the
Torture Act that relate to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by South
Africa.
It should be noted that in relation to the sources from which South Africa’s
perspective on universal jurisdiction can be derived, I limit myself to
legislation and relevant jurisprudence, which are in my view clearer, precise
and more credible in terms of reflecting the intentions of the State and
‘binding’ obligations in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. I therefore do
not consider statements by government officials on the question of universal
jurisdiction, though such statements may reflect state practice or a sense of
state obligation, subject to the context in which they were made, including
the nature and intention of the official making the statement. (John Dugard
International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 26 and 36 acknowl-
edges that evidence of state practice may be found in policy statements of
government, and a sense of obligation, subject to certain conditions, may also
be found in them.)
The relevant South African jurisprudence — the decision in the SALC
case — draws a clear distinction between investigation and prosecution in the
exercise of universal jurisdiction. A crucial issue in the case was whether an
investigation can be initiated while those accused of committing the crime in
question are not present in South Africa. This issue is important as it is linked
to the controversial issue of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia.
As a result, I limit myself to the question of investigating international crimes
in the exercise of universal jurisdiction in examining the case.
Before analysing the case, and in order to understand the issue in context,
it is important to locate the principle of universal jurisdiction within the
broader concept of jurisdiction, to consider its legal meaning and rationale,
and to consider how states have gone about transforming it into an operative
legal norm.
THE CONTEXT, MEANING, RATIONALE AND APPLICATION
OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Universal jurisdiction is located within the broader concept of jurisdiction,
which in turn refers to a state’s power to regulate its affairs or assert
sovereignty subject to its laws (Cryer et al op cit at 43). Two distinct yet
intertwined arms of jurisdiction can be distinguished: prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction (which are explained in Roger O’Keefe ‘Universal
jurisdiction: Clarifying the basic concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 735). In the criminal context, prescriptive jurisdiction
denotes ‘a state’s authority under international law to assert the applicability
of its criminal law to given conduct, whether by primary or subordinate
legislation, executive decree or, in certain circumstances, judicial ruling’ (ibid
at 736–7). This indicates the state’s authority to criminalise conduct and to
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punish persons that have committed the criminalised conduct. Enforcement
jurisdiction denotes ‘a state’s authority under international law actually to
apply its criminal law, through police and other executive action, and
through the courts’ (ibid at 740). While states do not have enforcement
jurisdiction outside their territories, prescriptive jurisdiction can be exercised
extraterritorially. Additionally, universal jurisdiction is seen as a ‘species’ of
prescriptive jurisdiction.
Generally, states can exercise jurisdiction over acts, including acts that
occur outside of their territory, as long as there is no specific rule that
prevents them from doing so (see Lotus (France v Turkey) Judgment No 9,
1927 PCIJ Reports Series A No 10 at 18–19). Traditionally, however, a basic
principle of jurisdiction is that a state can exercise jurisdiction where a crime
is committed within the state’s territory (the territoriality principle); where a
crime is committed by its national (the active personality principle); where
the victim is its national (the passive personality principle); and fourthly
where the state wants to protect its national security or interests (the
protective principle) (see Ilias Bantekas International Criminal Law 4 ed (2010)
332 and 338–44). These four principles require the establishment of a link
with the crime, the victim or the perpetrator which can either be territorial
or personal. The fifth basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, however, does not
require the establishment of such a link. This is referred to as the universality
principle. Any state can exercise jurisdiction over crimes that fall under the
universality principle. States have understood and incorporated the principle
of universal jurisdiction in different ways, resulting in some uncertainties as
to whether there is an agreed definition for the concept. As Van Den
Wyngaert J pointed out in her dissenting opinion in the case of Arrest Warrant
of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 2002 ICJ Reports
3, commencing at page 137 paras 44–5):
‘There is no generally accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conven-
tional or customary international law. States that have incorporated the
principle in their domestic legislation have done so in very different ways. . . .
Much has been written in legal doctrine about universal jurisdiction. Many
views exist as to its legal meaning and its legal status under international law.’
(The Arrest Warrant case concerned a warrant of arrest issued by a Belgian
Court for the arrest of a Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (‘DRC’) for crimes against humanity and breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. While the acts were committed in the DRC, Belgian national
law gave jurisdiction to its courts to try such crimes irrespective of where
they had been committed. The DRC brought a suit against Belgium in the
ICJ arguing that Belgium acted unlawfully in asserting universal jurisdiction
and ignoring the immunity of the minister — a suit which was ultimately
successful. While the main judgment in this case does not engage with the
concept of universal jurisdiction, the separate and dissenting opinions do, and
these will be referred to in this note where relevant.)
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s observation above, there have been efforts
towards clarifying its meaning or at least providing a working definition of
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the concept. A group of experts and legal scholars’ efforts to clarify the
concept resulted in the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction of
2001 (see Stephen Macedo (ed) The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
(2001), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf ). Princi-
ple 1(1) defines the concept as follows:
‘[U]niversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other
connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.’
Subsequently, in a 2005 resolution, the Institut de Droit International defined
the concept as follows (para 1):
‘Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional ground of jurisdic-
tion, means the competence of a State to prosecute alleged offenders and to
punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission of the crime
and regardless of any link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of
jurisdiction recognized by international law.’
Accordingly, universal jurisdiction has been defined in legal writing as
‘jurisdiction established over a crime without reference to the place of
perpetration, the nationality of the suspect or the victim or any other
recognized linking point between the crime and the prosecuting State’ (see
for example Cryer et al op cit at 50–1). The concept of universal jurisdiction
is a marked departure from the usual rules of criminal jurisdiction.
While there could be some uncertainties regarding its definition, there is
certainty regarding its legal rationale. The principle is justified on ‘the basis of
the severity of the crime and the undesirable consequences of impunity’
(Beth van Schaack & Ronld C Slye International Criminal Law and its
Enforcement: Cases and Materials 2 ed (2010) 113). In her dissenting opinion in
the Arrest Warrant case, Van Den Wyngaert J confirmed this by stating that
‘[d]espite uncertainties that may exist concerning the definition of universal
jurisdiction’, the legal rationale for its exercise is ‘very clear’ ((supra) para 46).
She stated further that ‘the ratio legis of universal jurisdiction is based on the
international reprobation for certain very serious crimes such as war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Its raison d’être is to avoid impunity, to prevent
suspects of such crimes finding a safe haven in third countries’ (ibid para 46).
The rationale behind the principle is therefore that ‘some crimes are so
heinous that their perpetrators should not escape justice by invoking
doctrines of sovereign immunity or sacrosanct nature of national frontiers’
(see Henry Kissinger ‘The pitfalls of universal jurisdiction’ (2001) 80 Foreign
Affairs 86: a piece which raises concerns regarding the exercise of this
universal jurisdiction). In the foreword to the 2001 Princeton Principles (op
cit at 16), Mary Robinson, then United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, reiterates and fortifies Kissinger’s words (emphasis supplied):
‘The principle of universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain
crimes are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled — and even
obliged — to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location
of the crime or the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.’
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Viewing this as an obligation is in line with the principle recognised under
various international instruments that states have an obligation to ‘extradite
or prosecute’, which in turn requires the concerned state to extend its
criminal jurisdiction where it chooses to prosecute (Arrest Warrant judgment
(supra) para 59).
Universal jurisdiction is based mainly on customary international law, but
can also be established under multilateral treaties. The principle does not
apply to all crimes; and while it applies to a range of international crimes, its
application for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity is widely
accepted (William A Schabas An Introduction to the International Criminal Court
4 ed (2011) 64). Though these crimes are core crimes in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court of 1998 (‘the Rome Statute’), the Statute itself
contains no explicit provision requiring states to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion. Notwithstanding the Rome Statute’s silence on universal jurisdiction,
in the process of domesticating the Statute (that is, translating the Statute into
domestic law), states parties to the Statute have introduced international
crimes in their domestic law — thus adopting universal jurisdiction. South
Africa is an example of such a state. Following its ratification of the Rome
Statute on 27 September 2000, South Africa proceeded to domesticate it
through the ICC Act in August 2002. This Act, as I shall explain below,
provides one of the legal bases for South Africa’s exercise of universal
jurisdiction. South Africa has also ratified the Convention against Torture,
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (‘the
CAT’), under which it can exercise universal jurisdiction over acts of torture
(see arts 5, 6 and 7).
The principle of universal jurisdiction does not automatically become ‘an
operative legal norm’: that is, while states may exercise universal jurisdiction
over international crimes, this is subject to a number of prerequisites. Xavier
Philippe (‘The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity:
How do the two principles intermesh’ (2006) 88 International Review of the
Red Cross 379) outlines three essential steps to the exercise of universal
jurisdiction: ‘the existence of a specific ground for universal jurisdiction; a
sufficiently clear definition of the offence and its constitutive elements; and a
national means of enforcement’. States, therefore, have the jurisdiction to
define and punish certain offences recognised by the international commu-
nity of nations as being of universal concern, and to adjudicate universal and
non-territorial crimes.
Based on limitations on its exercise, two categories of universal jurisdic-
tion can be distinguished: ‘absolute’ (also referred to as pure, broad, extensive
or true) and conditional (also referred to as narrow or strict) universal
jurisdiction.Absolute universal jurisdiction allows for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion in absentia. This implies that states can investigate and prosecute persons
accused of serious international crimes even if the accused is not within the
territory of the state concerned (Charles C Jalloh ‘Universal jurisdiction,
universal prescription? A preliminary assessment of the African Union
perspective on universal jurisdiction’ Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
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Working Paper No 2009–38 (2010) 8; see also Philippe op cit at 379–80).
There are, however, practical problems with the implementation of this form
of jurisdiction, as certain steps such as punishment itself would be difficult to
enforce if the accused is not present within the state concerned. In the Arrest
Warrant case ((supra), commencing at page 200), Bula-Bula J, in a separate
opinion, found the exercise of absolute universal jurisdiction to be contrary
to international law, stating that ‘[t]he idea that a State could have the legal
power to try offences committed abroad, by foreigners against foreigners,
while the suspect himself is on foreign territory, runs counter to the very
notion of international law’ (para 74 of the opinion).
Conditional universal jurisdiction, on the other hand, subjects its exercise
to the presence of an accused within the territory of the state concerned, as
the accused has to be available for trial. It places a condition on the use of
universal jurisdiction to prosecute a person accused of international crimes.
Thus, if a person accused of a serious international crime is present within the
territory of a state, that state has the right (as well as an obligation) to
prosecute the person (Jalloh op cit at 7; Philippe op cit at 379).
Despite the existence of the abovementioned categories, the practice of
many states has been to limit their use of universal jurisdiction, particularly in
relation to prosecution, to cases where the accused is present within their
territory. Thus, the distinction between absolute and conditional universal
jurisdiction, at a conceptual level, is arguably non-existent. In its 2005
resolution, the Institut de Droit International attempted to find a middle ground
between absolute and conditional universal jurisdiction, stating (in para 3(b)
that:
‘Apart from acts of investigation and requests for extradition, the exercise of
universal jurisdiction requires the presence of the alleged offender in the
territory of the prosecuting State or on board a vessel flying its flag or an aircraft
which is registered under its laws, or other lawful forms of control over the
alleged offender.’
This implies that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states includes
investigative acts in absentia and requests for extradition. In other words,
‘investigative acts and requests for extradition are permissible as a form of universal
jurisdiction over crimes under international law’ (Claus Kreb ‘Universal
jurisdiction over international crimes and the Institut de Droit International’
(2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 561 at 576–8). This part of the
resolution speaks to the question whether the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion allows for the commencement of an investigation where an accused is
not within the territory of the state concerned. This question was at the heart
of the SALC case, as will be seen below. The case raised the issue of whether
domestic proceedings can be initiated, in the form of an investigation,
relating to persons accused of an international crime who are not present in
South Africa.
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SOUTH AFRICA’S PERSPECTIVE ON UNIVERSAL JURIS-
DICTION
Universal jurisdiction in domestic law
The ICC Act
This part of my note does not endeavour to discuss the ICC Act in its
entirety. My aim is to highlight provisions that are relevant to the discussion
on the exercise of universal jurisdiction by South Africa, particularly in
relation to the investigation of international crimes. My discussion of the
ICC Act is more detailed than the GCA and Torture Act, as the ICC Act was
at the core of the SALC case.
The ICC Act is South Africa’s first domestic legislation on the implemen-
tation of international crimes — particularly crimes against humanity or war
crimes. These crimes could not be prosecuted domestically prior to the Act
because of the absence of legislation. The aim of the ICC Act is, therefore, to
provide a framework for the effective implementation of the Rome Statute
in South Africa; to give effect to South Africa’s obligation under the Rome
Statute; to make provision for crimes against humanity, the crime of
genocide and war crimes; to make provision for the prosecution of those
accused of committing these crimes within South Africa and beyond; and to
ensure South Africa’s co-operation with the ICC ‘in the investigation and
prosecution’of those accused of committing these crimes where South Africa
itself does not prosecute the persons (s 3).
It is commonly understood that universal jurisdiction can be better
enforced through the principle of complementarity. Accordingly, the ICC
Act recognises this principle as it is enshrined in the Rome Statute. The
Rome Statute states that the ICC ‘shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions’ (Preamble; art 1). The principle of complementarity is
‘a functional principle aimed at granting jurisdiction to a subsidiary body
when the main body fails to exercise its primary jurisdiction’ and seeks to
strike a balance ‘between respect for the principle of state sovereignty and
respect for the principle of universal jurisdiction’ (Philippe op cit at 380). In
this regard, the principle implies that the primary responsibility for the
prosecution of the crimes in the Rome Statute rests with national courts,
failing which the ICC can assume jurisdiction. In order for national courts to
carry out this primary responsibility, the Rome Statute lays down some
guiding norms on drafting national legislation on jurisdiction. For jurisdic-
tion to pass from national courts to the ICC, the crimes must be those
contained in the Rome Statute, and the state that has jurisdiction must ‘be
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’
(Rome Statute, art 17). So if South Africa has jurisdiction but fails to exercise
it and jurisdiction passes to the ICC, South Africa is still under an obligation
to assist and co-operate with the ICC, including in relation to requests for
assistance with ‘arrest and surrender’ (ICC Act, ss 8–32; see also the Rome
Statute, arts 86 and 87(7)).
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The ICC Act clearly defines when South Africa can assume jurisdiction
over the listed international crimes — crimes against humanity, crime of
genocide and war crimes. Section 4(3) of the ICC Act provides that a person
who commits any of the contemplated crimes outside of South Africa ‘is
deemed to have committed that crime in the territory of the Republic’ (a
distinctive feature of the Act); and South African courts can exercise
jurisdiction over persons accused of committing such crimes, where:
‘(a) that person is a South African citizen; or
(b) that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the
Republic; or
(c) that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory of
the Republic; or
(d) that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen or
against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.’
Section 4 of the ICC Act thus establishes various jurisdictional grounds on
the basis of the nationality of the accused or victim, the ordinary residence of
the accused or the victim, and the presence of the accused in South Africa. It
is evident that these bases go beyond the traditional grounds of nationality,
territoriality and passive personality to include universal jurisdiction. As the
court stated in the SALC case (para 13), the purpose of deeming all crimes
under the ICC Act that are committed beyond South Africa to have been
committed in the country, is ‘to give effect to the principle of universal
jurisdiction, and to confer jurisdiction on domestic courts for international
crimes’. The ICC Act has thus been identified as granting ‘relatively
expansive jurisdiction’ to courts in South Africa in relation to the listed
international crimes (Lee Stone ‘Implementation of the Rome Statute in
South Africa’ in Chacha Murungu & Japhet Biegon (eds) Prosecuting Interna-
tional Crimes in Africa (2011) 311). However, it is evident from s 4(3)(c) that
South Africa adopts ‘conditional’ universal jurisdiction in relation to the
prosecution of persons that have committed crimes under the ICC Act. The
exercise of ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction is conditioned on the presence of the
accused in South Africa. The problems with exercising universal jurisdiction
in absentia in the prosecution of accused persons will not arise in the South
African context if the ICC Act is complied with, since this is explicitly
prohibited by the Act.
Furthermore, the ICC Act is in harmony with the Rome Statute in
dealing with the question of immunities and privileges of certain individuals.
Section 4(2) of the ICC Act diverges from customary international law, but
rightly so in this context, by excluding immunity for certain government
officials or for their status to be used as a basis for the reduction of their
sentence following conviction. These persons are: ‘a head of state or
government, a member of a government or parliament, an elected represen-
tative or a government official’. The subsection also excludes the defence of
superior orders for any ‘member of a security service or armed force’ that is
‘under an obligation to obey a manifestly unlawful order of a government or
superior’.
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Three further points should be noted in relation to the ICC Act. First, in
accordance with the Rome Statute and relevant international law principles,
s 5(2) of the ICC Act limits the crimes that can be prosecuted to those
committed after the Act came into force. Secondly, s 5(1) of the Act places a
procedural limitation requiring the ‘consent’ of the National Director of
Public Prosecutions (‘NDPP’). The NDPP is ‘the head of the prosecuting
authority’ with ‘the power to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the
state, and to carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting
criminal proceedings’ (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
s 179(1) and (2); National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, s 20). In
deciding whether or not to institute prosecution, the NDPP must take into
consideration South Africa’s obligations and the principle of complementar-
ity (ICC Act, s 5(3)).
The procedural limitation stated above is not an absolute bar to prosecu-
tion however, as a decision by the NDPP not to prosecute ‘does not preclude
the prosecution of that person in the Court’ (ICC Act, s 5(6)). It is also
important to note that the consent requirement is limited to prosecution and
not investigation. This distinction is important as it was at issue in the SALC
case. Thirdly, in domesticating the Rome Statute, the ICC Act incorporates
the Statute in whole. Also, art 1 of the Act states that the use of ‘rules’ therein
speaks to ‘the Rules of Procedure and Evidence referred to in Article 51 of
the [Rome] Statute’. This implies that South African courts, in prosecuting
international crimes under the ICC Act would have recourse to the
procedural and substantive provisions in the Rome Statute (Anton Katz ‘An
Act of transformation: The incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC
into national law in South Africa’ (2003) 12(4) African Security Review 27).
The Geneva Conventions Act
The purpose of the GCA is to domesticate the Geneva Conventions and the
Protocols additional to them, to ensure that South Africa complies with these
treaties, and, of particular relevance, to ‘ensure prevention of, and punish-
ment for, breaches of the Conventions’ (see the Preamble and s 2). The GCA
does not deal with various jurisdictional grounds as is the case in the ICC Act
but, similarly to s 4(3) of the ICC Act, an offence under the GCA that is
committed outside of South Africa is deemed to have been committed
within South Africa. The relevant jurisdiction provision in this regard is
s 7(1), which gives any court in South Africa jurisdiction to ‘try a person for
any offence under this Act in the same manner as if the offence had been
committed in the area of jurisdiction of that court, notwithstanding that the
act or omission to which the charge relates was committed outside the
Republic’. In choosing an appropriate court to try the person, the Chief
Justice and the NDPP have to be consulted (GCA, s 7(2)). Section 6(2) is also
of relevance as it not only recognises offences committed ‘within’ South
Africa but also those committed ‘outside the borders’ of the country.
Annexed to the GCA are the relevant Geneva Conventions, which contain
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provisions that require the exercise of universal jurisdiction by state parties
and speak to the immediate investigation of breaches of the Conventions.
The Torture Act
The Torture Act mirrors the ICC Act in its approach in that it not only allows
for universal jurisdiction but also identifies similar jurisdictional grounds.
The aims of the Act are, amongst others, to give effect to South Africa’s
obligations with regards to the crime of torture in terms of the CAT, and to
‘provide for the prosecution of persons who commit’ acts of torture (s 2(1)).
Jurisdiction over such acts can be exercised on the basis of the nationality of
the accused or victim, the ordinary residence of the accused or the victim,
and the presence of the accused in the territory or territorial waters of South
Africa or ‘on board a ship, vessel, off-shore installation, a fixed platform or
aircraft registered or required to be registered’ in South Africa (s 6(1)). The
provision also stipulates that an offence committed outside South Africa is
deemed to have been committed in the country, ‘regardless of whether or
not the act constitutes an offence at the place of its commission’ (s 6(2)). The
consent of the NDPP is required before an accused can be prosecuted; and
the NDDP is also responsible for choosing the court where the accused will
be prosecuted (s 6(2)).
INVESTIGATING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: THE SALC CASE
As I have indicated above, the case stemmed from a request to the high court
to review the decision of the government not to investigate crimes against
humanity (torture in particular) that had allegedly occurred in Zimbabwe
(para 1(1)). The ICC Act and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3
of 2000 formed the basis of the application to the court (para 1(2)). For
present purposes, my focus will be on the ICC Act as well as the Rome
Statute. While the question of locus standi and other issues were raised in the
case, my focus in this section is on issues that speak to the question of
initiating investigations under the principle of universal jurisdiction (for a
general analysis of the case, see Christopher Gevers ‘South Africa Litigation
Centre & another v National Director of Public Prosecutions & others’ (2013) 130
SALJ 293).
The case was brought by two non-governmental organisations — the
Southern African Litigation Centre and Zimbabwe Exiles Forum — on
behalf of the victims. The respondents were the NDPP, the Head of the
Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU), the Director-General of Justice and
Constitutional Development and the National Commissioner of the South
African Police Service.
The applicants had submitted a ‘dossier’ (which the court refers to as the
‘torture docket’ or ‘docket’) to the PCLU, which is tasked with investigating
and prosecuting crimes in the ICC Act, and is part of the National
Prosecuting Authority (‘NPA’). The dossier detailed (a) evidence of crimes
against humanity, specifically torture, committed by Zimbabwean officials
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and (b) South Africa’s obligations in this regard (para 1(10)). Crimes against
humanity refer to acts ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with the knowledge of the attack’
(Rome Statute, art 7(1)). Torture is listed under both the Rome Statute and
the ICC Act as a crime against humanity (Rome Statute, art 7(1)(f); ICC Act,
Schedule 1, part 2). The Rome Statute and the ICC Act define torture as ‘the
intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
upon a person in custody or under the control of the accused; except that
torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions’.
Sections 3 and 4 of the ICC Act read together make crimes against
humanity and therefore torture committed outside South Africa similarly
crimes under the domestic law of South Africa, as I have indicated above.
The issues before the court included, amongst others, the international and
domestic obligations of South Africa to investigate and prosecute interna-
tional crimes enshrined in the Rome Statute and the ICC Act; the obligation
of the government in the investigation and the prosecution of the crimes;
consistency of the request for investigation with the objects and purpose of
the ICC Act; the sufficiency of the information provided by the applicants in
justifying the initiation of an investigation; and the relevance of the
considerations, including political considerations, relied upon by the respon-
dents (para 1(6)).
The state’s obligation to investigate international crimes
The applicants averred that South Africa has an obligation under the ICC Act
to investigate the alleged crimes (para 1(9)). The applicants also averred that
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), in line with its obligations under
the ICC Act, should consider the dossier; ‘take appropriate action’; and arrest
the Zimbabwean officials whenever they visit South Africa (para 1(13)). It
should be noted that while the acts complained of were committed in
Zimbabwe, s 4(3) of the ICCAct deemed the acts to have been committed in
South Africa. Hence, as the court pointed out, the torture victims ‘are to be
regarded as having been tortured in South Africa’ (para 13). Accordingly, the
court found that the protections in the South African Constitution extended
to these victims; and to find differently, the court held, ‘would make a
mockery . . . of the universal jurisdiction principle’, rendering the provisions
of the ICC Act redundant (ibid). Other factors convinced the court. First,
Zimbabwe is not a party to the Rome Statute and there was no evidence
that Zimbabwe planned to investigate and prosecute the officials. Secondly,
Zimbabwe has not ratified the CAT (which would have required it to
investigate the alleged acts of torture) (see arts 5, 6 and 7). The primary
jurisdiction of Zimbabwe therefore fell away since it had not exercised
jurisdiction on the issue. This provided justification for South Africa to
exercise jurisdiction in line with the ICC Act.
On the other hand, South Africa’s policy on investigations is clear on the
need to respect state sovereignty. Also, while investigations could be carried
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out ‘by way of a formal letter of request’ or informally ‘through Interpol
channels, or whatever other informal methods’ (para 1(15)), s 2 of the
International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996 details only
formal requests. This implies, arguably, that it prohibits travelling to another
country for the purposes of investigation without that country’s knowledge
and consent. If South Africa follows formal channels of investigation and
seeks assistance, such a request can be refused by Zimbabwe in terms of its
Criminal Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act 13 of 1990.
Despite the allegations in the dossier, no investigation was initiated and the
movements of the Zimbabwean officials accused of the crimes were not
monitored (para 3.1). The respondents raised a number of concerns regard-
ing South Africa’s exercise of jurisdiction in the case. It was argued that
investigations ‘would be impractical and virtually impossible’ (para 3). The
South African Police Service (‘SAPS’), in particular, was of the view that the
‘anticipated presence’ of the Zimbabwean officials in South Africa was not
enough of a legal basis for the institution of an investigation (para 4). It was
argued that investigations would be hampered by questions relating to its
legality; difficulties in the collection of evidence; inability to secure the
cooperation of Zimbabwean authorities and the likelihood of resistance from
Zimbabwe; the probability that the evidence would have to be obtained in a
‘covert manner’ due to the identity of the Zimbabwean officials involved;
respect for Zimbabwe’s sovereignty; the possibility of the investigations
being compromised; the negative impact that an investigation would have on
not just diplomatic relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe but also
on relations between Southern African Development Community (‘SADC’)
forces; and the impact it would have on future investigations (paras 4, 5 and
10).
It should be noted in relation to possible co-operation by Zimbabwean
officials that the existence of jurisdiction in itself does not imply an obligation
on ‘the territorial or nationality State to assist in any investigation, provide
evidence or extradite suspects’ (Cryer et al op cit at 60). Their co-operation
can either be compelled by treaty, or depends on political will. Since
Zimbabwe is not a state party to the Rome Statute and has not ratified the
CAT, its co-operation is not required under that statute or the CAT, and
South Africa is therefore dependent on political will to bring those accused of
the acts of torture to justice. Also, a potential negative consequence in
relation to the question of securing evidence at the prosecution stage is worth
noting — that is, the failure of universality cases ‘to achieve the standard of
proof for a criminal conviction’ (Cryer et al ibid).
The court was of the view that the concerns raised did not provide
justifiable grounds for refusing to initiate an investigation in line with
domestic and international law obligations. The court held that the respon-
dents should have born in mind the ‘primary obligation’ of ensuring that the
‘purpose and objects of the ICC Act’ are fulfilled in line with South Africa’s
‘international obligation to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of inter-
national crimes in light of the information placed before the Respondents’
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(para 27). This would be in line with South Africa’s commitment, as a party
to the Rome Statute, not only to ending impunity for the ‘perpetrators’ of
international crimes but also to ‘contribute to the prevention of such crimes’
(Rome Statute, Preamble). This commitment is reiterated in the Preamble to
the ICC Act, where South Africa commits to bringing perpetrators of
international crimes to justice either in its domestic courts ‘in terms of its
domestic laws where possible, pursuant to its international obligations’ under
the Rome Statute, or to do so in the ICC where South Africa declines or is
unable to deal with the case in its domestic courts, ‘in line with the principle
of complementarity’. Having regard to South Africa’s obligations under the
ICC Act and the Rome Statute, the applicants argued that South Africa
ought to have investigated the alleged crimes (para 15). The court found the
respondents to have breached both their domestic and international obliga-
tions. It held (para 15) that
‘in failing to initiate an investigation, thereafter attempting to justify their
decision on the basis of material errors of fact of law, and through taking into
account irrelevant factors and failing to consider relevant ones, [the respon-
dents] have flouted their domestic and international obligations’.
The court held that the respondents failed to discharge their obligations ‘to
initiate, manage and direct an investigation in a co-operative manner as
envisaged by the ICC Act’ (para 15). It is evident that further investigations
had to be carried out in order to establish, at the very least, whether the
alleged acts constituted crimes against humanity (para 9). This would
strengthen South Africa’s exercise of jurisdiction in the case if it proceeds
with prosecution.
The question of investigation in absentia
A crucial issue that was raised in relation to initiating the investigation was
whether it is legal for investigations to commence while the accused
Zimbabwean officials were not present in South Africa (para 9). While s 4(3)
places conditions on the exercise of jurisdiction, s 4(1) does not require the
presence of an accused. It merely states that ‘any person who commits a crime
is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment’.
Further, s 4(3) clearly links the conditions only to securing the jurisdiction of
the courts. Put differently, the exercise of ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction is subject
to the presence of an accused in South Africa, while the exercise of
‘prescriptive jurisdiction’ is not. This implies that while an investigation
could be undertaken when an accused is not present in South Africa,
prosecution before a judicial body can only take place when the accused is
present. This addresses concerns regarding the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion in absentia mentioned earlier. In fact, it has been argued that s 4(3) is
‘motivated by the South African legislature’s concern to avoid trials in
absentia’ (see Christopher Gevers ‘The application of universal jurisdiction
in South African law’ (2012) available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/universal-
jurisdiction-in-south-africa).
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The respondents also argued that there needed to be a legal provision
permitting investigations; otherwise, any investigation would be ‘null and
void’ (para 22). In this regard, it should be recalled that s 5(1) of the ICC Act
does not require that the authorisation of the NDPP be sought before an
investigation could proceed (para 21). This is a requirement only in relation
to prosecution.
The threshold required for the initiation of an investigation
During the hearing, concerns were raised regarding the negative impact an
investigation would have on foreign relations. The respondents focused
largely on whether the information before them was sufficient for a
prosecution, instead of focusing on its relevance for an investigation, as it is
only after such an investigation that a decision on prosecution can be made.
In response, the court considered the ‘threshold’ required for a decision on
whether or not to initiate an investigation. With reference to art 53 of the
Rome Statute, the court held that only ‘a reasonable basis’ should exist (para
28). Article 53 prohibits the initiation of an investigation only where ‘there is
no reasonable basis to proceed’. The court relied on art 53 of the Rome
Statute because there is no provision in the ICC Act or any other domestic
legislation on the standard of evidence that is appropriate to trigger the
initiation of an investigation. The court was of the view that there was
reasonable basis to initiate an investigation based on the information before
the respondents, and that it was irrelevant at this stage whether the material
was sufficient for prosecution (para 28).
The question of political considerations and immunity
The court further held that ‘when an investigation under the ICC Act is
requested, and a reasonable basis exists for doing [sic] an investigation,
political considerations or diplomatic initiatives, are not relevant at that stage
having regard to the purpose of the ICC Act’ (para 31). Political or
diplomatic considerations, as the court observed, would only become
relevant at the stage of deciding whether or not to prosecute (ibid). This also
implies that the issue of immunity enjoyed by the accused Zimbabwean
officials is not relevant at the investigation stage (para 31). This issue is
important as some of the accused Zimbabwean officials could enjoy
immunity under customary international law. It must be emphasised here
that it is an established principle under international law that certain state
officials enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction (see the Arrest Warrant
case (supra), the judgment of the court, para 51). Bantekas (op cit at 127)
states that immunity from criminal jurisdiction means that
‘a court cannot entertain a particular suit, not that the defendant is discharged
from criminal liability altogether or that the jurisdiction of the court is
extinguished. This means that once the procedural bar of immunity is removed
. . . the criminal liability of the accused re-emerges and that person becomes
once again susceptible to criminal prosecution.’
Immunity can be enjoyed on the basis of the governmental functions that a
person carries out (referred to as functional immunity, or immunity ratione
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materiae or, subject matter immunity); or on the basis of the person’s status
such as heads of states (referred to as personal immunity, or immunity ratione
personae, or procedural immunity) (see Ronald Slye ‘Immunities and
amnesties’ in Max du Plessis African Guide to International Criminal Justice
(2008) 182). The exercise of universal jurisdiction in the context of
immunity is complex because immunity is generally not recognised for
international crimes. For example, art 27(1) of the Rome Statute excludes
immunity for individuals being tried before the International Criminal Court
(‘ICC’). Article 27(2) explicitly excludes immunity for state officials. Thus,
when exercising universal jurisdiction in terms of legislation domesticating
the Rome Statute, a sitting state official cannot benefit from immunity,
despite ordinarily enjoying immunity under customary international law.
The high court in the SALC case cited the trial of Charles Taylor as an
example of immunity being denied to state officials for international crimes.
The court, however, incorrectly refers to the ICC (para 31), as Taylor was
tried by the Special Court of Sierra Leone and not the ICC. The court’s view
on the question of immunity at the stage of investigation accords with the
position of Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal JJ in their joint separate
opinion in the Arrest Warrant case ((supra), opinion commencing at page 63).
They held in that case that, in the exercise of universal jurisdiction,
‘commencing an investigation on the basis of which an arrest warrant may
later be issued does not of itself violate’ the principle of immunity (ibid para
59). The DRC, in the case, had argued that any investigation against the
minister concerned, with the aim of bringing him to court, would constitute
a violation of the principle of immunity (ibid para 47). Belgium had argued
that, for crimes that violate the ‘fundamental interests of the international
community’, ‘territorial presence’ was not a condition for the exercise of
universal jurisdiction (ibid para 8). Belgium’s stance was that an investigation
or prosecution initiated against an accused person outside its territory was in
line with international law and practice (ibid). In the South African context,
the ICC Act is very clear that the presence of an accused person is a condition
for the initiation of prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction.
The court’s order
The court concluded that ‘[i]f a proper investigation had been made, it
would have been the first step that would have enabled the First Respondent
[the NDPP] to make a subsequent decision whether or not to prosecute, if
the perpetrators were present in the territory of the Republic, as some of
them indeed had been’ (para 32). It should be noted that an investigation is
not only important in informing the decision to prosecute but is also relevant
should South Africa decide to refer the case to the ICC. This is in accordance
with art 14 of the Rome Statute: ‘a referral shall specify the relevant
circumstances and be accompanied by such supporting documentation as is
available to the State referring the situation’. Without a proper investigation,
it would be difficult for a state, when referring a case, to provide this
necessary supporting documentation.
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Accordingly, in its order, the court found the decision not to investigate to
have been invalid (para 33). The decision was thus set aside. The court
proceeded to set out what is required of the relevant organs of state, since the
case stemmed from the government’s failure to fulfil its domestic and
international obligations under the ICC Act and Rome Statute respectively.
The Head of PCLU was required to assist the National Commissioner of the
SAPS in evaluating the request for an investigation to be initiated (para 33).
The court specified that the investigation of the alleged crimes should be
done expeditiously and comprehensively, after which, a decision needed to
be made on whether or not a prosecution should be instituted (para 33).
It is worth noting that just over two months after the SALC decision, the
ICJ issued a decision that also emphasises the importance of initiating
(preliminary) investigations once there is reason to suspect a person for acts of
torture. This was in the case of Belgium v Senegal (ICJ judgment of 20 July
2012 available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf ), relating
to the obligation of Senegal to either prosecute the former President of Chad,
Hissène Habré (who was present in Senegal at the time), or to extradite him
to Belgium to face criminal proceedings. Though Belgium v Senegal was based
on the CAT and not the Rome Statute or legislation implementing the
Rome Statute, it does deal with universal jurisdiction for torture and is
therefore relevant to a discussion on the obligation to investigate torture. The
case emphasises the need for states to adopt legislation in line with
international obligations to which they have committed, and that these grant
them universal jurisdiction to institute investigations over acts of torture.
CONCLUSION
South Africa’s perspective on universal jurisdiction, particularly on the
initiation of investigations under this principle, is evident not only from the
ICC Act but also from the SALC case. The case complements the ICC Act in
reflecting South Africa’s perspective on the principle, particularly the
obligation of the state in terms of the ICC Act in the exercise of universal
jurisdiction. It is evident that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is not only
limited to the prosecution of international crimes, but also includes their
investigation, as the latter informs the decision on the former. Accordingly,
the SALC case accentuates South Africa’s obligation under the ICC Act and
its international obligation to investigate international crimes, irrespective of
where the crimes occur. It also clarifies the instances in which the obligations
in the exercise of universal jurisdiction are triggered. While South Africa’s
exercise of ‘enforcement’ universal jurisdiction is subject to the presence of
the person accused of committing an international crime within the country,
the exercise of ‘prescriptive’ universal jurisdiction is not subject to this
condition. Whether the current perspective remains unchanged would
depend on how other courts might address the issue, as the government may
appeal the decision.
Notwithstanding this, the court’s decision is significant for accentuating
the commitment of South Africa to protecting rights and ending impunity
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for grave offences. Individuals who have committed international crimes in
neighbouring countries will therefore not see South Africa as a safe haven.
The decision is also significant in that it illustrates the positive impact of the
Rome Statute at the domestic level. When the Rome Statute becomes a part
of domestic law, it enables states directly to address the problem of impunity
for international crimes. Since the SALC decision illustrates that South
Africa takes its obligations under the Rome Statute seriously, South Africa’s
compliance with the AU’s stance on disregarding arrest warrants from the
ICC therefore comes into question, as it would be contrary to its Rome
Statute obligations if it complies with the stance.
Furthermore, despite the SALC decision being a narrow one, given its
focus on the South African implementing legislation vis-à-vis the Rome
Statute, the issues raised in the case are issues that other countries may also
face should they implement the Rome Statute in a similar fashion. It is
evident from the case that there is a chain of political, practical and policy
challenges relating to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. Some of the
challenges such as those relating to securing evidence are not unique to the
exercise of universal jurisdiction, but could also arise in the exercise of
jurisdiction under other jurisdictional grounds. In relation to the respect for
state sovereignty in the exercise of universal jurisdiction, it is evident from
the consideration of complementarity and universal jurisdiction above that,
to some extent, the principle of complementarity facilitates the practical
application of universal jurisdiction in a way that prevents conflicts in the
exercise of jurisdictions, respects the primacy of prosecution for the state that
has jurisdiction, and respects state sovereignty.
In addition to the challenges highlighted in the consideration of the SALC
case, a further practical challenge is whether states that exercise universal
jurisdiction would be able to guarantee the necessary ‘due process’ (fair arrest,
detention and trial) standards. This was not at issue in the SALC case. A
simple response to this would be not to extradite accused persons to states
that cannot guarantee acceptable standards of due process. This has in fact
been the situation in practice, since ‘[g]overnments regularly deny extradi-
tion to courts that are unable to ensure high standards of due process’
(Kenneth Roth ‘The case for universal jurisdiction’ (2001) 80 Foreign Affairs
150 at 153).
Lastly, further legislative developments in terms of the GCA and Torture
Act not only reflect the (potential) positive impact of the relevant treaties at
the domestic level in enabling states to address impunity for international
crimes, but also South Africa’s commitment to this goal.
POSTSCRIPT
The government subsequently appealed the High Court’s decision; and on
27 November 2013, the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) delivered its
judgment on the appeal (see National Commissioner of the South African Police
Service v South African Litigation Centre [2013] ZASCA 168). The SCA held
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that the SAPS is ‘empowered to investigate the alleged offences irrespective
of whether or not the alleged perpetrators are present in South Africa’ and
‘required to initiate an investigation under the [ICC Act] into the alleged
offences’ (para 70). The competence of the SAPS to initiate an investigation
is derived from a reading of s 205(3) of the Constitution, relevant provisions
in the SAPS Act and the NPA Act, and relevant provisions in the ICC Act
(paras 53–5). The SCA observed that ‘[w]hilst it is true that s 4(3) of the ICC
Act does not expressly authorise an investigation prior to the presence of an
alleged perpetrator within South African territory, it also does not prohibit
such an investigation’ (para 55). The fact that South African authorities were
being requested to conduct an investigation within South Africa’s borders
was of importance, as it is in line with relevant principles relating to
jurisdiction and state sovereignty; and, as the court stated, if ‘the investigation
is limited to within South Africa’s own borders, the relevant authorities are
empowered to investigate the commission of any crimes criminalised by the
ICC’ (para 56). However, an investigation could extend beyond South
Africa’s borders if consent or co-operation of Zimbabwe is obtained (paras 56
and 68). Comparative approaches in other jurisdictions considered by the
SCA revealed that ‘no universal rule or practice’ exists ‘against the initiation
of investigations in the absence of alleged perpetrators’ (paras 58–66). Taking
this into consideration, the court held that adopting a strict approach to the
‘presence requirement’would defeat the object and purpose of South Africa’s
legislation and would be contrary to the fight against impunity (para 66).
What strengthened the need to initiate an investigation — in addition to
South Africa’s obligations in this regard — was the prospect of the
perpetrators being present in South Africa (ibid). It is evident from the
judgment that the SCA has also bolstered South Africa’s commitment to
ending impunity for grave crimes and protecting rights. Accordingly, the
SCA judgment has been described as ‘a landmark decision for local and
international justice’ (‘Zim torture ruling a landmarks decision — SALC’The
Zimbabwe Mirror, 28 November 2013).
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